Abstract. This paper is concerned with rhetorical argumentation that aims to alter the beliefs of the listener, and so to influence his future actions, as opposed to classical argumentation that is concerned with the generation of arguments, usually as logical proofs, for and against a given course of action. Rhetorical argumentation includes rhetoric moves such as Threat, Reward and Appeal. Rhetorical argumentative utterances generated by an agent contribute to the strength of its relationship with the listener. This paper examines advice and the rhetoric particle "I advise you . . . " that may be used to strengthen such relationships.
Introduction
The study of argumentation is in two camps: first, classical argumentation that is concerned with the generation of arguments, usually as logical proofs, for and against a given course of action that support decision making processes; and second, rhetorical argumentation that aims to alter the beliefs of the listener, and is the focus of this paper. The seminal work [1] builds on the notion of one argument "attacking" another; we are more interested in how to counter the effect of the partner agent's arguments rhetorically, and how to lead a dialogue towards some desired outcome. Rhetorical argumentation includes moves such as Threat, Reward and Appeal; although no formal model of the meaning of these speech acts has been proposed yet. Argumentation in this sense is concerned with building (business) relationships through shaping another agent's reasoning, beliefs and expectations [2] .
Agents may attempt to counter their partner's arguments with Inform statements. The subject of an inform may be factual, e.g. "today is Tuesday", or non-factual, e.g. "this movie is exciting". Opinions are non-factual informative speech acts, they are the speaker's evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in context, and may be used in an attempt to build relationships with the listener. Advice is opinion that is uttered with the aim of either changing the listeners beliefs or influencing the listener's future actions, e.g. "if I were you I would buy the Nikon". We give the semantics of advice utterances and describe their strategic use advice in argumentative dialogue [3] .
In this paper an agent's rationality is based on two basic suppositions: everything in the world is constantly changing and not all facts can be known by an agent. An agent will have its model of: the world, of the other agents and of itself evolving at all time, and does not have, for instance, a fixed set of preferences. As it continually receives information from the environment, i.e. it is situated in it, its beliefs change. In particular, an agent changes its models both to manage its future dialogue and because of what has already been said.
When agents engage in argumentative dialogue they may attempt to discover the objectives, needs or preferences of the other agent. This has the direct consequence of updating the model of the other agent and so enabling the conversation to progress. Section 2 discusses the communication language and advice illocutions. Section 3 proposes a rational agent architecture that contains the necessary components to give (higherorder) semantics to these illocutions in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Communication Framework
The communication language we consider, U , contains three fundamental primitives:
what is the world α aims at bringing about and that β has the right to verify, complain about or claim compensation for any deviations from, Observe(α, ϕ) to represent that a certain state of the world, ϕ, is observed, and Done(u) to represent the event that a certain action u 2 has taken place. In our language, norms, contracts, and information chunks will be represented as instances of Commit(·) where α and β can be individual agents or institutions, U is the set of expressions u defined as:
where ϕ v is a formula with free variable v, illoc is any appropriate set of illocutionary particles, ';' means sequencing, and context represents either previous agreements, previous illocutions, or code that aligns the ontological differences between the speakers needed to interpret an action u, and term represents logical predicates. t represents a point in time. 3 We will note by Φ the set of expressions ϕ used as the propositional content of illocutions.
For example, we can represent the following offer: "If you spend a total of more than e100 in my shop during October then I will give you a 10% discount on all goods in November", as:
or, "If I tell you who I buy my tomatoes from then would you keep that information confidential?" as:
In order to define the terms of the language introduced above (e.g. pay(β, α, y) or discount(y, 10%)) we need an ontology that includes a (minimum) repertoire of elements: a set of concepts (e.g. quantity, quality, material) organised in a is-a hierarchy (e.g. platypus is a mammal, australian-dollar is a currency), and a set of relations over these concepts (e.g. price(beer,AUD)). 4 We model ontologies following an algebraic approach [4] as: An ontology is a tuple O = (C, R, ≤, σ) where:
1. C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic data types); 2. R is a finite set of relation symbols; 3. ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation on C (a partial order) 4. σ : R → C + is the function assigning to each relation symbol its arity where ≤ is a traditional is-a hierarchy, and R contains relations between the concepts in the hierarchy. The concepts within an ontology are closer, semantically speaking, depending on how far away they are in the structure defined by the ≤ relation. Semantic distance plays a fundamental role in strategies for information-based agency. How signed contracts, Commit(·) about objects in a particular semantic region, and their execution Observe(·), affect our decision making process about signing future contracts on nearby semantic regions is crucial to modelling the common sense that human beings apply in managing trading relationships. A measure [5] bases the semantic similarity between two concepts on the path length induced by ≤ (more distance in the ≤ graph means less semantic similarity), and the depth of the subsumer concept (common ancestor) in the shortest path between the two concepts (the deeper in the hierarchy, the closer the meaning of the concepts). Semantic similarity could then be defined as:
where l is the length (i.e. number of hops) of the shortest path between the concepts, h is the depth of the deepest concept subsuming both concepts, and κ 1 and κ 2 are parameters scaling the contribution of shortest path length and depth respectively. Agents give advice when they perceive that the listener has less experience in an area. Advice is thus a rhetorical move that uses the asymmetry of information between two agents. It is a genuine ecological move as it makes full sense in the context of a dialogue where both sides are revealing their positions and thus its meaning can only be determined in the context of the agents' mutual evolving models of each other.
In the context of negotiation advice makes sense before the signing of the contract -warning the other agent about potential consequences, "I advise you not buy a reflex camera for your grand mother, they are too bulky", or afterwards to justify a contract violation, "if I were you I would be happy with receiving bottles from the 2008 vintage instead of 2007, they are much better". They are naturally composed of a comparison between contracts or options and a justification.
Argumentation Agent Architecture
This Section describes how argumentative interactions are managed by our agent using the LOGIC illocutionary framework [6] that was originally proposed for agents whose sense of distributive justice spanned equity, equality and need. [6] focussed heavily on the prelude stage of a negotiation where agents prepare using the five LOGIC dimensions [7] . The five LOGIC dimensions are quite general:
-Legitimacy concerns information that may be part of or relevant to contracts signed. -Options concerns contracts where a contract is a set of commitments one for each agent in the contract. -Goals are the objectives of the agents. -Independence concerns the agent's outside options -i.e. the set of agents are capable of satisfying the agent's needs. -Commitments are the commitments that an agent may have.
and are used in this paper to manage all incoming communications including the exchange of "I advise you. . . " argumentative illocutions. A more formal representation model for LOGIC is:
that is a set of commitments and intentions.
Our description is from the point of view of agent α in a multiagent system with a finite number of other agents B = {β 1 , β 2 , . . . }, and a finite number of information providing agents Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . } that provide the context for all events in the system -Θ t denotes the state of these agents at time t. The only thing that α 'knows for certain' is its history of past communication that it retains in the repository H t α . Each utterance in the history contains: an illocutionary statement, the sending agent, the receiving agent, the time that the utterance was sent or received. Utterances are organised into dialogues, where a dialogue is a finite sequence of related utterances.
α acts to satisfy a need, ν, that are considered in context (ν, Θ t ), and does so by communicating an utterance, (μ, β), containing an illocutionary statement, μ ∈ U , to another agent, β ∈ B. If an utterance is part of a complete dialogue, d, that aimed to satisfy a need then the dialogue is tagged with: the triggering need, ν, the prevailing context, Θ t , and an ex post rating r ∈ R of how satisfactorily the dialogue satisfied the need. Such a rated dialogue has the form:
. Agent α observes the actions of another agent β in the context Θ t . Observations are of little value unless they can be verified. α may not posses a sufficient variety of sensory input devices. Sensory inadequacy is dealt with by invoking a truthful institution agent, ξ, that promptly reports what it sees. So if β commits to delivering twelve sardines at 6:00pm, or states that "it will rain tomorrow" and is committed to the truth of that prediction, then α will eventually verify those commitments when ξ advises what occurs. If β passes an "I advise you. . . " message to α, or even a simple Inform(. . . ) message, we assume that β is committed to the validity of the contents. All communication is recorded in H t α that in time may contain a large amount of data. To make this data useful to α's strategies it is summarised and categorised using the LOGIC framework. To achieve this α requires a categorising function v : U → P({L,O,G,I,C}) where U is the set of utterances. The power set, P({L,O,G,I,C}, is required as some utterances belong to multiple categories. For example, "I will not pay more for Protos 5 than the price that John charges" is categorised as both Option and Independence. 
is a set of linear constraints on the posterior distribution for X i . M t is then maintained from utterances received using update functions that transform utterances into constraints on M t . Proactive reasoning is described in [8] . For example, in a simple multi-issue contract negotiation α may estimate P t (acc(β, α, δ)), the probability that β would accept contract δ, by observing β's responses. The distribution P t (acc(β, α, δ)) is classified as an Option in LOGIC. Using shorthand notation, if β sends the message Offer(δ 1 ) then α may derive the constraint:
, and if this is a counter offer to a former offer of α's, δ 0 , then:
In the not-atypical special case of multi-issue bargaining where the agents' preferences over the individual issues only are known and are complementary to each other's, maximum entropy reasoning can be applied to estimate the probability that any multi-issue δ will be acceptable to β by enumerating the possible worlds that represent β's "limit of acceptability" [9] . As another example, the predicate canDo(α, β, ν) meaning β is able to satisfy α's need ν -this predicate is classified as Independence in LOGIC.
Updating M t is complicated when the integrity of utterances received are questionable -it would certainly be foolish for α to believe completely every utterance received. For completeness the procedure for doing this, and for attaching an a priori belief to utterances (see Equation 7) , is summarised in Section 3.1. If at time t, α receives such an utterance u that may alter this world model then the (Shannon) information in u with respect to the distributions in M t is:
If β sends the utterance u to α then the information about β within u is:
. M t may contain distributions in any of the five LOGIC categories, where H is Shannon entropy.
Intimacy and Balance Model. The intimacy and balance model is the second way in which H t α is summarised. Intimacy is degree of closeness, and balance is degree of fairness. Informally, intimacy measures how much one agent knows about another agent's private information, and balance measures the extent to which information revelation between the agents is 'fair'. The intimacy and balance model is structured using the LOGIC illocutionary framework and the ontology O 6 . For example, the communication Accept(β, α, δ) meaning that agent β accepts agent α's previously offered deal δ is classified as an Option, and Inform(β, α, info) meaning that agent β informs α about info and commits to the truth of it is classified as Legitimacy. The intimacy and balance model contains two components per agent: first α's model of β's private information, and second, α's model of the private information that β has about α.
The intimacy of α's relationship with β i , I Trust, Reliability and Honour. The third way in which α summarises H t α is with trust, reliability and honour measures. These concepts are all concerned with the relationship between commitment and enactment. Trust is concerned with the relationship between a signed contract (the commitment) and the execution of the contract (the enactment). Reliability is is concerned with the relationship between information (where the truth of the information is the commitment) and its subsequent verification (the enactment). Honour is similarly concerned with arguments.
We represent the relationship between commitment and enactment using conditional probabilities, P(u |u). If u is a commitment and u the corresponding subsequent observation then P(u | u) is the probability that u will be observed given that u had been promised. For example, if u is an "I advise you. . . " message from agent β then the conditional probability, P(u |u), is an estimate of α's expectation of what will eventually be observed, and the uncertainty in the validity of β's communication is the entropy H(u |u).
[10] describes three aspects of the relationship between commitment and enactment:
1. as the difference between our expectation P(u | u) and a distribution that describes what we would ideally like to observe P I (u | u):
2. as expected preferability of the enactment compared to the commitment:
3. as predictability of those enactments that are preferable to the commitment:
where if u ≤ v in the ontology let: (Prefer(u , u, v) ) > κ for some constant κ, and
There is no neat function mapping the concepts of trust, reliability and honour into the five LOGIC categories. For example, the relationship between contractual commitment and contractual enactment is concerned with both Options and Commitment. Alternatively, the relationship between the commitment and enactment of an argument is concerned with Legitimacy and what ever else the argument is about. However the five LOGIC categories together provide a complete framework for representing these concepts.
Self Model. Finally, α's self model is not directly related to communication. It represents the LOGIC relationships between the agent's components and the various summaries of the communications received.
Updating
t , at time t is a set of random variables, M t = {X i , . . . , X n } each representing an aspect of the world that α is interested in. In the absence of in-coming messages the integrity of M t decays. α may have background knowledge concerning the expected integrity as t → ∞. Such background knowledge is represented as a decay limit distribution. One possibility is to assume that the decay limit distribution has maximum entropy whilst being consistent with observations. Given a distribution, P(X i ), and a decay limit distribution D(X i ), P(X i ) decays by:
where Δ i is the decay function for the X i satisfying the property that
, where ν i < 1 is the decay rate for the i'th distribution. Either the decay function or the decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: Δ t i and D t (X i ). The following procedure updates M t for all utterances u ∈ U . Suppose that α receives a message u from agent β at time t. Suppose that this message states "I advise you that something is so" with probability z, and suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief R t (α, β, u) to u -a method for estimating R t (α, β, u) is given below. Each of α's active plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distributions {X i } ∈ M t together with associated update functions 7 
is a set of linear 7 A sample update function for the distribution P t (acc(β, α, δ)) is given above.
constraints on the posterior distribution for X i . Denote the prior distribution Pr j p j . This may be calculated by introducing Lagrange multipliers λ: L(q, λ) = j qj log
. . , n is the set of given constraints g, and a solution to
. . , I leads eventually to q. Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient when the data is sparse [11] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [12] .
that is the reduction in uncertainty in X i where H(·) is Shannon entropy. Equation 5 takes account of the value of R t (α, β, u). If X(u) is the set of distributions in M t that u affects, then the observed reliability of β on the basis of the verification of u with u is:
For any concept c ∈ O, R t (α, β, c) is α's estimate of the reliability of information from β concerning c. In the absence of incoming communications the integrity of this estimate will decay in time by:
where μ is the learning rate, that estimates the reliability of β's advice on any concept c. If X(u) are independent the predicted information in u is:
Suppose α sends message u to β where u is α's private information, then assuming that β's reasoning apparatus mirrors α's, α can estimate I t (β, α, u) . This completes the the update process for M t .
Advice Interaction
An opinion is a speaker's evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in context. Advice is a speaker's evaluation of a particular aspect of a thing in the context of the speaker's beliefs of the listener's context. An "I advise you. . . " illocution is a form of advice [13] . It is a directive in Searle's classification of speech acts. This illocution gives advice to the listener to take some action, for example, "I advise you I would buy that Ferrari." It is not an assertive. Such advice will only be considered seriously by the listener if he believes that the speaker's beliefs about him are accurate. In terms of this work, this is indicated by a degree of intimacy in the appropriate section of the LOGIC framework. An agent may be motivated to issue an "I advise you. . . " illocution either to develop a reputation for giving good advice -in the LOGIC framework this develops intimacy particularly in the L dimension -or to directly influence the listener's actions possibly to the benefit of the speaker "If I were you I would accept the offer I made you yesterday". The rational effect of these two examples are different. In the first example, whether the listener follows the advice is not important, what matters is whether he believes at some time that the advice was good, in the second example, the intention is that the listener will follow the advice.
"I advise you. . . " illocutions may be issued with varying degrees of knowledge of the state of the listener. For example, "I advise you to buy the Ferrari." assumes that the speaker has beliefs about the listener's intentions -such as he intends to buy a car. Another example, "If I were you I would offer them e100 now" assumes that the speaker has beliefs about both the listener's intentions and the state of his active plans. For simplicity we restrict these beliefs to the listener's intentions.
In common usage, an "I advise you. . . " illocution may contain advice either to act (i.e. advice that the listener should utter) as described above, or that the listener should modify his mental attitudes "I advise you to count on tomorrow being fine". The first of these is an "I advise you" action, and the second, that advises the agent to modify his beliefs, is an "I advise you" belief change 9 . In addition, such advice may advise the listener to modify his goals, his intentions or his plans -these three cases are omitted for brevity. A definition of an "I advise you" action is given in Table 1 . The definition of an "I advise you" belief change is not presented here.
Discussion
In this paper we have argued that a a rich model of rationality is required to properly model agents in a changing world. Particularly important is the need to model dialogical moves that refer to the agent's internal models (beliefs, or goals) that are updated as a dialogue develops. Traditional constructivist approaches share a more static view of the world. Dialogues may influence internal models along a number of dimensions. In this paper we have followed a simplified version of the approach of [6] classifying them as beliefs, plans, desires, capabilities and intentions. This model is very flexible and clear in representing and classifying the evolving pieces of information that an agent's memory requires in order to correctly interpret and generate illocutionary moves. We have given a precise model of how this evolution of the memory can be implemented using concepts drawn from information-theory. Finally, a formal description of a prototypical dialogical move, "I advise you . . . ", is given. We have argued, that if agents are to be situated in a changing world, they need to incorporate an ecological mind that among other things requires a higher order interpretation of communication languages. This is so, because self-reference and the reference to whole dialogues is unavoidable in argumentative information exchanges.
As future lines of work, we plan to extend this approach to further advice-giving illocutions, and to revisit other classical dialogical moves such as those found in negotiation dialogues (e.g. propose, accept, reject). The evolution of our information-theoretic agents is being further examined in the development of negotiation agents in the Diplomacy game: we plan to use a Diplomacy testbed (www.dipgame.org) to obtain experimental results from agents interacting with human beings using rich languages that have illocutionary moves similar to the one modelled here. Table 1 . Advice actions in FIPA-style format. The two feasibility preconditions are alternative representations of i's beliefs of the superiority of his knowledge, and the two rational effects represent two possible motives for uttering the illocution.
Summary The sender (for example, i) informs the receiver (for example, j) that the sender believes the receiver should perform some action (for example, a) if the receiver's intentions includes some goal (for example, c) Message A tuple consisting of an action expression denoting the action that is advised, and Content an intention that the receiver may hold. Description I_Advise_You indicates that the sending agent:
• believes he knows the receiving agent holds a particular intention • believes his knowledge of facts concerning the receiving agent's intention is better than the receiving agent's knowledge of it • intends the receiving agent to believe that the action is in his interests • believes that the receiving agent may act otherwise :receiver (set (agent-identifier :name j)) :content "((advise-action (agent-identifier :name j) (accept-proposal :sender (agent-identifier :name j) :receiver (set (agent-identifier :name k)) :content "accept the Nikon" ("want camera"))" :language fipa+if_I_were_you+advise-action) where advise-action is an action that the receiver is advised to perform
